Goal 2 identifies the risks posed by individual and organizational use of money services businesses. According to the IRS, a money services business (MSB) is anybody that sells money orders, travelers' checks, or pre-paid access items for more than $1,000 per person, per day, in one or more transactions, regardless of the quantity of money transmission activity . Since only 1/5 of MSB’s are registered with the federal government, it is arduous, if not impossible, for the FinCEN to monitor the origin and destination of many of these funds. Although some MSB’s qualify for registration exemption, the FinCEN has had a difficult time determining how many actually do . Based on their reported action plans, however, it would appear that FinCEN did not have any clear legal avenues to address the issue of MSB’s and their ease in existing under the radar of the federal government. Although they provided some plans to work with other governmental agencies like the Internal Revenue Service and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, it is not clear that these measures resulted in increased prosecution or even increased MSB registration.

Finally, Goal 4 discusses the threats that come from participation in trade-based money laundering, more specifically involvement in the Black-Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). As defined by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the BMPE is the largest money laundering scheme in the world, in which individuals and organizations trade “dirty” US dollars for “clean” Colombian pesos. This is often done through bribery and corruption within Colombian banks, leaving no clear indication that such a transaction occurred . In response, FinCEN, in partnership with ICE, have created Trade Transparency Units (TTU) in Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, and Colombia, with the cooperation of the US Department of State, and they are working with the governments of Mexico, the Philippines, and Malaysia to do the same . Contrary to Goal 2, the steps taken by these government agencies appear to be more tangible and extend beyond nebulous administrative aspirations. However, following additional research, it is unclear if this action item yielded an increase in prosecution or subsequent conviction for participation in these black-market exchanges.

Last year, Congress passed the Anti-Money Laundering and Corporate Transparency Act, which falls under under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (“NDAA”). In its own summary, the CTA describes its purpose to compel individuals establishing a corporation or an LLC to disclose any “beneficial owners”. Under 17 CFR § 240.13d-3, a beneficial owner is an individual with voting and investment power within a corporation or LLC . This act, which relied directly on the advice and criticisms of the FATF, worked to broaden the legal scope of the federal government in its ability to investigate and prosecute corruption and money laundering crimes. One of the first changes made in the legislation was to increase the transparency in incorporation practices . This would require businesses interested in filing articles of incorporation to provide some additional information, including a FinCEN registration number, thus addressing one of the goals set forth by the agency almost fifteen years ago. Additionally, the information disclosed to the FinCEN at the time of incorporation will not be available to the public but may be given to various government bodies upon request . However, the CTA also includes a list of entities that are exempt from being classified as “reporting companies”, which would put them outside much of the mechanisms implemented in this act. Most notably, exempt entities include banks, state and federal credit unions, individual brokers, and investment companies registered with the SEC . This once again raises the inference that the actions taken by the United States are not done with sincerity or are at least taken with the interests of groups taking advantage of these legal loopholes in mind. It is difficult to view the CTA as a good faith attempt to adjust the legislation based on the advisement of the FATF when many of the entities that exist outside of the grasp of law enforcement are again assisted by the governing body they are trying to evade. Furthermore, as identified by the American Bar Association, the CTA appears to place a larger burden on smaller sized businesses than that of larger ones . Considering the staggering amount of money that is laundered through the US, it is counterintuitive to create a body of law that governs the drops in the bucket but fails to regulate the rest of the water.

It should be noted, however, that the strongest legal steps the US has taken in the past twenty years to investigate and to enforce money laundering laws were following the US PATRIOT Act of 2001. Although many constitutional arguments have been made regarding the validity of the Patriot Act, its nearly systematic restructuring of governmental investigative power resulted in a broadened exploratory scope. Notably, Section 319(b) – Bank Records Related to Anti-Money Laundering Program which authorizes the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury to order a summons or subpoena to any international bank that maintains a correspondent account in the United States for records related to such accounts, including records outside the United States referring to the deposit of assets into the foreign bank, and to aid the government's ability to seize illicit funds of individuals and entities located in foreign countries . However, it is hard not to address that such an act grants the United States government a great deal of latitude in interacting with private foreign citizens. In a 2002 seminar, the International Monetary Fund released a report addressing the concerns of this seemingly unlimited scope. The seminar report acknowledges that there does not appear to be any language limiting the power of the Attorney General to interlope on the affairs of international citizens, a grant of power that had previously been unseen . However, at this stage in the timeline, given its short proximity to the passing of the Patriot Act, the IMF does not extend far beyond its general concerns for this far-reaching discretion. This is likely, in part, due to the pressures that the US was placing on other nations regarding their commitment to counterterrorism . Despite a mildly negative response by the IMF, Section 319(b) would produce some prosecutorial results, following an indictment by the Department of Justice against Banco Popular of Puerto Rico, which would result in a fine of over $21 million . However, this case does appear to be an outlier, given that Banco Popular was being fairly conspicuous with their money laundering practices and did not seem fly under the radar like many of their laundering contemporaries.

In a report from 2011, the American Bar Association highlighted some of the recent instances of prosecution of money laundering in an entry called International Anti-Money Laundering . Within the report, there were numerous settlements from both organizations and individuals, adjustments in legislation and administrative orders, and international enforcement actions. Interestingly, in the first case discussed in the report, Hasie v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency of U.S., 633 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2011), despite the district court ruling in favor of the OCC, in many ways this case embodies a loss in a long-term effort to combat money laundering schemes. Here, the issue before the court was whether the OCC’s disclosure of a suspicious activity report to a criminal defendant made the report public information . If such an action were to render the reports public knowledge, then it would make them available upon request for use in civil litigation . The court ultimately ruled in favor of the OCC, reasoning that the reports were non-public information because the prospect of making such reports public information did not outweigh the importance of maintaining confidentiality .

The argument in favor of corporate confidentiality once again highlights an internal struggle pervasive within the American legal system; a struggle that creates a showing of inconsistency, if not hypocrisy among the international stage. When comparing the wide range of latitude, the federal government is willing to give with the intrusion of American investigative powers into the private information of international citizens, it becomes difficult to reconcile its emphasis on protecting the privacy of these corporate entities. However, there is an argument to be made that the emphasis on privacy can serve to shield these probing mechanisms since there is an assumption that once the government concludes its surveillance of an individual outside of their sovereignty, at least that information will be “protected”. It will likely be up to international bodies to determine whether such inconsistencies inspire or diminish confidence enough to allow such activities to continue.